

AVBL

6 December 1969

SUBJECT: After Operations Report for Period 25 Sep 69 - 21 Oct 69

Commanding General  
1st Inf FCo, 5th Inf Div (Mech)  
ATTN: S-3  
APO San Francisco 96477

1. (C) Name and Type of Operation: (Un-named), Security
2. (C) Date of Operation: 25 Sep 69 - 21 Oct 69
3. (C) Location: Quan Cam Lo, Viet Nam. Maps, VIETNAM, 1:100,000, sheets 6442 and 6342.
4. (C) Control Headquarters: 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry
5. (U) Reporting Officer: LTC Joseph L. Hadaway
6. (C) Task Organization:

<u>25 Sep 69</u>	<u>27 Sep 69</u>	<u>4 Oct 69</u>	<u>5 Oct 69</u>	<u>12 Oct 69</u>	<u>22 Oct 69</u>
B/3/5	B/3/5	A/3/5	A/3/5	A/3/5	A/3/5
C/3/5	C/3/5	B/3/5	B/3/5	B/3/5	C/3/5
	K/3-4 Marines	C/3/5	C/3/5	C/3/5	C/2/34
		C/2/34	C/2/34	C/2/34	M/3-4 Marine
		K/3-4 Marines		F/2-4 Marines	

7. (C) Support Forces:

a. Artillery proved valuable during the operation especially the illumination of suspected areas at night. However, the problem of obtaining clearance because of the proximity of populated areas greatly limited the employment of high explosive ordnance.

b. The employment of the minesweep teams from Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion was invaluable. The teams' daily sweep of QL-9 in conjunction with the security provided by TF 3-5 Cav resulted in negative mining incidents on QL-9 between Khe Gio Bridge and Dong Ha for the reporting period.

c. Scout dog teams provided by the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division Scout Dog Platoon were especially valuable when employed in night ambushes.

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17 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

18 Oct 69: 2/C/3/5 sprung a night ambush at 0145 hours with negative results. C/3/5 ACAV hit a mine vic ED 045569, results 3 US WIA.

19 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

20 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

21 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

12. (C) Results: The method of operation described above successfully restricted enemy movement throughout the AO and greatly hampered enemy mining of QL-9 and harassment of the local populace by rice and tax collection.

13. (C) Administration:

a. Average strength figures for the reporting period are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
HHT	18	3	234
A/3/5	5	0	182
B/3/5	5	0	162
C/3/5	5	0	172
C/2/34	5	0	77

b. Total casualties for TF 3-5 Cav for the reporting period are as follows:

US KIA - 2  
US WIA - 17

14. (U) Logistics:

a. During the reporting period TF 3-5 Cav was deployed along QL-9 performing a route security mission. QL-9 is a hard surface all weather road which allowed resupply to be effected entirely by ground vehicles.

b. Meeting the supply requirements for this mission taught no new lessons but did serve to verify previous lessons employed. The tank and pump unit - 5 ton vehicle combination is totally inadequate for fueling field elements in RVN due to the lack of trafficable terrain. Resupply

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1 Oct 69: C/3/5 located a minefield vic YD 179586 20' wide x 40' long.

2 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

3 Oct 69: At 1400 hours an ACAV from B/3/5 hit a mine vic YD 033565. Results: 1 KIA, 2 WIA and total loss of vehicle.

4 Oct 69: A/3/5 and C/2/34 arrived in AO White.

5 Oct 69: A/1/61 replaced K Company 3/4 Marines at Cam Lo Bridge.

6 Oct 69: Continued minesweep and route security of QL-9. A/3/5 replaced A/1/61 at Cam Lo Bridge.

7 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

8 Oct 69: C/3/5 spotted movement by radar vic YD 050565. Engaged with 81mm mortars at 2155 hours with negative results.

9 Oct 69: C/3/5 received mission to standby for possible reaction force for the Khe Gio Bridge. The unit was not committed.

10 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

11 Oct 69: At 1435 hours C/3/5 received four (4) 122mm rockets during a rocket attack on Camp Carroll. Results: negative personnel or equipment losses. At 1952 hours C/3/5 received five (5) 82mm mortars with negative losses in personnel or equipment. Counter mortar fire was employed.

12 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

13 Oct 69: While OPCON to 1/11 Infantry B/3/5 engaged an unknown size enemy force vic YD 171656 at 1145 hours. Results 5 enemy KIA, 1 enemy WIA (POW), 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. B/3/5 received five (5) mortar rounds at 1929 hours with negative losses of personnel or equipment.

14 Oct 69: Negative significant activity.

15 Oct 69: C/3/5 at 2225 hours received a report from a Marine (F-2/4) patrol of 15 - 20 enemy moving past their location. As the enemy approached 3/C/3/5 vic YD 094575 the platoon engaged with 90mm main gun, .50 cal machinegun, 7.62mm machinegun, and individual small arms. A sweep resulted in 1 enemy KIA, 1 enemy POW and capture of thirteen (13) enemy rucksacks.

16 Oct 69: C/3/5 conducted a sweep vic YD 094575 which resulted in the capture of the POW and enemy rucksacks listed above.

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d. C&C ships were supplied by Brigade Aviation when available. They were extremely valuable in controlling ground activities especially when Marine foot patrols were used. The ability of the aircraft to cover the entire AO daily also increased security and operational efficiency.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Annex A

9. (C) Mission: TF 3-5 Cav had the mission of securing QL-9 between the Khe Gio Bridge (YD 025561) and Dong Ha and the populated areas of Huong Hoa and Cam Lo. This security mission was to cover the redeployment of those elements of the 3rd Marine Division located at Vandergrift and Elliot Combat Bases.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: TF 3-5 Cav secured QL-9 with outposts along the road and reconnaissance in force in adjacent areas during the day. Extensive night ambushes were conducted throughout the AO in addition to Troop/Company and platoon sized NDPs.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Method of Operation: The mission of TF 3-5 Cav was accomplished by a daily minesweep of QL-9 from Dong Ha to the Khe Gio Bridge. OP's were established along QL-9 during daylight hours and extensive night ambushes throughout the AO at night. When not attached as bridge security forces, Marine platoons were cross attached to ACAV platoons and conducted reconnaissance in force operations adjacent to QL-9 during the day and established ambushes along QL-9 at night.

b. Operations Narrative:

25 Sep 69: TF 3-5 Cav conducted assigned mission of minesweeps and route security for QL-9 with negative enemy activity.

26 Sep 69: B/3/5 discovered and destroyed eleven (11) 107mm artillery rounds adjacent to QL-9 which were emplaced to hit TF 3-5 Cav CP vehicles vic YD 046568.

27 Sep 69: C/3/5 received small arms fire in their NDP from the village of Thon Truong Xa vic YD 189598 at 0631H. The National Police were requested to check out the area.

28 Sep 69: Negative significant enemy activity. All units performed their assigned missions.

29 Sep 69: B/3/5 performed RIF of an area covered by a previous sniffer mission. They discovered propoganda leaflets directed at allied soldiers vic YD 074583.

30 Sep 69: C/3/5 OP received sniper fire from the same village their NDP had been fired upon on 27 Sep 69.

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
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of POL was successfully completed with two M548 tracked vehicles equipped with two 500 gallon rubber fuel pods.

15 (C) Commander's Analysis:

a. This operation presented no new lessons but served to reemphasize previous lessons learned.

b. Relations with the local populace seemed to pose only minor problems. The squadron medical facilities were able to assist the MEDCAP program in the Cam Lo area on several occasions. Injured civilian personnel were frequently treated by medics in the field or brought to the squadron aid station in Cam Lo. The only significant problem area was the presence of civilians (mostly children) in close proximity of the vehicles where they might assess the vehicle's fighting capabilities, compromise radio frequencies or possibly sabotage or steal equipment. Keeping the vehicles closed and in some cases employing concertina wire around the vehicle at a few meters distance seemed to prove adequate without unduly alienating the populace.

  
JOSEPH L. HADAWAY  
LTC, Armor  
Commanding

2 Annexes:

- A. Intelligence
- B. Area of Operation Overlays

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1. (U) Terrain and Climate:

a. The area of interest is formed by the coordinates YD 0269 in the northwest to YD 2460 in the northeast to YD 2456 in the southeast and YD 0256 in the southwest (See Annex B). This area is primarily comprised of cultivated and abandoned cultivated land with moderate to dense patches of tropical undergrowth. The higher terrain supported growth of double and triple canopy jungles.

b. The Cam Lo River provided the most critical obstacle to armor movement. The primary crossing site was located at the Cam Lo Bridge vic YD 147604. The numerous streams in the lowlands leading into the Cam Lo River resulted in considerable difficulty in maneuvering through the lowlands. The highlands were characterized by numerous gulleys and defiles that supported normal drainage into the Cam Lo River. These features added to the difficulty of armor movement.

c. Avenues of approach were greatly limited by the mountains on both sides of the lowlands and constant patrolling of waterways by RF/PF elements.

d. Weather conditions posed no serious problem to normal operations. During the first part of October light rains with gusting winds that lasted until near the end of the reporting period made maneuverability difficult. The latter part of the reporting period was characterized by hot, humid days with negligible winds.

2. (C) Enemy Situation:

a. During the reporting period the squadron received intelligence information from 1/5 Infantry that in late August 1969 the 1st Bn, 27th NVA Regt, with whom the squadron had participated in battle in late April, had again infiltrated into SVN and was operating in the surrounding area. Intelligence reports indicated that the 27th NVA Regiment had an estimated strength of 400 men in the maneuvering battalion and an estimated 100 men in support of its offensive operations.

b. During the reporting period the squadron encountered light and sporadic enemy contact. The enemy usually relied upon sniper and harassing fire to engage TF 3-5 Cav. Actual contact with the enemy consequently did not reveal any major items of intelligence value. At 082300H Oct 69 an estimated 35 to 40 enemy sappers attacked a Marine outpost vic YD 616563 (Khe Gio Bridge). Results were negative intelligence information, 7 x friendly KIA, 5 x enemy KIA and negative enemy equipment captured. On 152225H Oct 69 C/3/5 reported movement and engaged the area vic YD 094575. A subsequent sweep of the area resulted in the capture of one POW and thirteen (13) enemy rucksacks. The POW indicated that he was a member of the K-9 Co, 33d Sapper Bn. The 33d Bn is currently listed as a Sapper Battalion of the 27th NVA Regiment. K-9 Company was not listed on the Order of Battle. The POW also stated that elements of the NVA 26th and 31st

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Annex 1. (INTELLIGENCE) to After Operation Report for Period 25 Sep 69 - 21 Oct 69

Battalions were operating in the immediate area. Neither unit could be located on OB's maintained by this unit. The rucksacks were inventoried and included items that indicated that the unit had possibly maintained a female membership, (several brassieres and medicine that the interpreter indicated was for fomelos). The rucksacks also provided office materials such as mimeograph paper (4 reams) and one pack of carbon paper. Many agent reports were received by this unit concerning the appearance of NVL/VC teams in villages or hamlets to collect rice or propogandize the populace. It appeared that the primary mission of the enemy for this reporting period was the collection of rice and preparation for future offensive operations.

3. (C) During the entire reporting period TF 3-5 Cav made extensive use of numerous intelligence aids such as sniffer missions, aerial reconnaissance and night observation devices. Intelligence liaison was maintained with the 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) and a team from the 517th MI detachment at the Cam Lo District and MACV headquarters.

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
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
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Reference: Maps, VIETNAM, AMS Series L7011, sheets 6312 I, II, III, IV and sheets 6311 I and IV.

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
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


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Reference: Maps, VIETNAM, AMS Series I/7011, sheets 6312 I, II, III, and IV and sheets 6311 I and IV.



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
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6 OCT - 11 OCT 69



Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50,000 AMS Series LT01, sheets 6342 I, II, III, IV, and sheets 6341 I and IV.



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Reference: Maps, VIETNAM, AMS Series I/POLL, sheets 6342 I, II, III, and IV  
and sheets 6341 I and IV.

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